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We use firm-level administrative data from Ecuador to study the implications of ‘reverse 
withholding’ for firms’ tax behavior. Withholding does not affect tax liability of firms, but it may 
result in a discontinuity in the audit probability around the withholding threshold. Exploiting 
variation in withholding rates across industries and over time, we find that firms’ profit taxes 
concentrate near the withholding rate. To explore the link between bunching and evasion, we use 
data from third party reports on sales and costs. We show that the firms that bunch are more 
likely to conceal their sales and inflate their costs. Finally, we create a profile of the firms that 
bunch and of their general managers: medium size firms in the coastal region headed by single 
males are significantly more likely to bunch and, presumably, to evade taxes.   
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Tax enforcement in developing countries is severely constrained by the weak information base
and large informal economy (Goode (1984), Gordon ed. (2010), Stiglitz (2010), Boadway
and Sato (2009), Gordon and Li (2009), Emran and Stiglitz (2005, 2007)). The challenges
faced by tax administration in developing countries are especially daunting when it comes
to tackling income tax evasion (Bird and Zolt (2005), Dasgupta and Mookherjee (1998),
Goode (1984)). Even in developed countries, income tax evasion is a major problem with
certain groups of tax payers, especially the self employed (Shoup (1951), Alm et al. (2004),
Soos (1990)). A widely used instrument for reducing income tax evasion and improving
compliance by both individuals and ﬁrms is withholding by a third party.1 Income tax
withholding at the source by an employer has a long history, and it is now used in almost
all developed and developing countries.2
While from its inception, withholding as a tax enforcement tool has been applied to
employment income (wages and salary), in many developing countries withholding has in-
creasingly been used to ensure compliance by the small ﬁrms and self employed. This type
of withholding is called “reverse withholding” because a ﬁxed percentage of a ﬁrm’s sales
are withheld by a large ﬁr ma tt h et i m ew h e nat r a n s a c t i o ni sm a d e .T h ew i t h h e l da m o u n t
can be typically applied as a payment on the ﬁrm’s tax liability. Tax withholding can be an
eﬀective tool to combat tax evasion, but it also creates a “threshold” that can potentially
aﬀect a ﬁrm’s economic decisions including its reported tax liability. This paper analyzes if
the threshold introduced by this policy induces ﬁrms to “bunch” near the withholding rate,
and it explores the possibility that “bunching” may indicate tax evasion.3
1For an interesting analysis of the role of third party in improving tax compliance, see Kleven et al
(forthcoming).
2Withholding or “taxation at source” was introduced ﬁrst in England when income tax was reenacted
in 1803. The principle of “taxation at source” was designed to tackle “the gross fraud and evasion” that
characterized the ﬁrst income tax introduced in 1799 (see Sabine, 1966).
3The formal economic literature on the interaction between withholding and evasion is limited. Among
the few available papers, Yaniv (1988) constructs a theoretical model to analyze how withholding of wage
1The observation that thresholds and other nonlinearities (kinks) in the tax system can
aﬀect tax reporting and also cause distortions by altering economic decisions has been the
focus of a growing theoretical and empirical literature. Among theoretical contributions,
Keen and Mintz (2004) show that value added tax (VAT) thresholds create incentives for
ﬁrms to bunch just below the threshold, and it distorts the ﬁrm size distribution in an
economy. Recent empirical works that focus on such thresholds and kinks include Onji
(2009) and Saez (2010). Onji (2009) analyzes how Japanese ﬁrms’ responded to a value-
added tax threshold that provided preferential tax treatment for smaller ﬁrms (less than
500 million yen in sales). Onji ﬁnds evidence of ﬁrms bunching near the imposed threshold.
Presumably, large ﬁrms had incentives to avoid taxes and “masquerade” as many small ﬁrms
by separately incorporating business segments. In an interesting paper, Saez (2010) exploits
k i n k si nt h eU . S .i n c o m et a xs c h e d u l et oe s t i m a t eh o wi n d i v i d u a l s ’r e p o r t e di n c o m ec h a n g e s
as the marginal tax rate increases. He ﬁnds that the compensated elasticity of reported
income with respect to the marginal tax rate is about zero for wage earners but substantially
higher among those with self-employment income. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
analysis of the eﬀects of the threshold created by tax withholding in the existing literature.
Note that the threshold created by withholding is diﬀerent from other thresholds in the
tax system produced by exemptions or discontinuities in tax rates. Unlike the thresholds
discussed in the literature, for example, due to exemptions from VAT and kinks created by
income tax brackets or diﬀerential VAT rates, withholding rate does not aﬀect the tax liability
of a ﬁrm. If nothing else in the tax system is aﬀected by the introduction of withholding or
a change in the withholding rate, it should not aﬀect the tax behavior of the ﬁrms subject to
withholding. But withholding can aﬀect the behavior of ﬁrms because such thresholds can
and do aﬀect the monitoring of ﬁrms by the tax authority in a discontinuous fashion. This is
likely to occur, because tax devolutions (when tax liabilities are lower than withheld funds)
income by an employer can lead to evasion of the non-withheld taxes through non-ﬁling of individual return.
2generally entail higher audit probabilities.4 The diﬀerential monitoring intensity induces
some ﬁrms to adjust their reported tax liability to match closely with the taxes withheld.
The withholding threshold can thus, in principle, lead to tax evasion. We develop a simple
model of tax evasion by ﬁrms that captures these insights (see section (2) below), and
provides the conceptual framework for the empirical analysis reported later in the paper.
Using the universe of ﬁrm-level records from the Tax Administration Agency in Ecuador,
we compute the distribution of the 2006 ﬁrms’ ‘proﬁt tax/sales revenue’ ratio (henceforth
tax/sales ratio) and show the existence of obvious spikes just around the ﬁrms’ withholding
requirements.5 While the theory developed in section (2) below suggests that tax evasion
could explain the bunching around the withholding threshold, one cannot rule out other ex-
planations. For instance, spikes in the density of 2006 reported tax/sales ratio could simply
be reﬂecting the shape of the true distribution of ﬁrms’ proﬁts. It may be possible (though
highly unlikely) that the tax administration has a good estimate of the true distribution of
proﬁts, and set the “right” withholding rate—one that facilitates taxpayers’ compliance. To
test if this is the case, we use a quasi-experimental approach. Withholding requirements
in Ecuador vary across industries and over time: for some industries (manufacturing, con-
struction and wholesale trade and retail) they increased from 1 to 2 percent in June 2007;
for other industries (transportation) they remained constant at 1 percent. We exploit these
variations across time and industry in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence framework to estimate the
eﬀects of a change in the withholding rate on the tax reporting of the ﬁrms.
The evidence presented in this paper show that bunching around the withholding rates
is clearly observed in all industries in 2006. More interesting is the ﬁnding that the pattern
radically changes in 2007 only for those industries where withholding rates were raised. The
4As noted by Andreoni et al (1998), many tax agencies follow a cut-oﬀ rule, and concentrate their audit
resources below the cut-oﬀ. The withholding rate seems to act as a focal point for establishing such a cut-oﬀ
for auditing the ﬁrms.
5Although we use the term ‘sales revenue’, it may include additional sources of a ﬁrm’s revenue other
than sales.
3empirical evidence shows ﬁrms that bunch around the withholding rate in 2006 increase
their tax/sales ratio by a larger amount after withholding rates went up. This implies
that the ﬁrms that bunched around the 1 percent threshold in 2006 were systematically
underreporting taxes, presumably to take advantage of the discontinuity in the audit function
around the threshold. The ﬁrms whose true tax obligation exceeds their withheld amount
seem to maneuver their tax declarations and report a lower tax that closely matches their
withheld funds.
To explore the link between bunching and tax evasion, we use data on sales revenue and
costs reported by third parties as an independent source of information. We investigate if
the group of ﬁrms that bunched in 2006 around the 1 percent threshold is more likely to
declare incorrect information to the tax authority (compared to the third party reported
information). To achieve this task, we use the database used by the tax administration in
Ecuador to cross-check tax declarations.6 In particular, we have been able to gather infor-
mation about self-reported and third-party reported revenue (domestic sales plus exports)
and costs (intermediate input costs plus imports) for most of the ﬁrms in our panel. Having
two sources of information allows us to compare whether ﬁrms misreport revenue and/or
costs on their proﬁt tax returns. Using simple linear regression models, we ﬁnd that, indeed,
ﬁrms that bunch are more likely to conceal revenue (sales under-reporting) and inﬂate input
costs (costs over-reporting).7
Because ﬁrms that bunch around the withholding rate are more likely to misreport taxes,
auditing eﬀorts could be focused around them. Hence, for control purposes it is useful to
construct a proﬁle of such ﬁrms. Besides ﬁrms’ characteristics, we have gathered information
6Kleven et al. (2010) extend the standard economic model of tax evasion to incorporate third-party
reported and self-reported income. While all advanced economies use third-party information to prevent
and control tax evasion, some developing countries, including Ecuador, are increasing their eﬀorts to collect
third-party data.
7Unfortunately, third-party reports are not available for 2006 but only for 2007. Thus, we assess if ﬁrms
that bunch near the threshold in 2006 are more likely to underreport sales or over report costs in 2007.
4about the demographic characteristics of the ﬁrm’s general manager, such as his/her gender,
age, education and marital status (using administrative records from the Ecuadorian Civil
Registry). It is found that medium size ﬁrms in the Ecuadorian Coastal region led by a
single male general manager are signiﬁcantly more likely to bunch and, thus, may be more
likely to misreport their tax declarations.
To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst paper in the literature to analyze possible
bunching of ﬁrms’ reported proﬁt tax payments due to withholding, and also provide evidence
that bunching around withholding rate may be indicative of tax evasion. Our empirical
analysis exploits an interesting quasi-experiment in Ecuador where withholding rates of only
some industries were modiﬁe d . T h i sp r o v i d e su sw i t has t r o n g e ri d e n t i ﬁcation strategy
to analyze the impact of withholding threshold on tax reporting. Finally, we are able to
compute objective indicators of misreporting (diﬀerence between self-reported and third-
party-reported income and costs), and use it to test if bunching around the threshold is
associated with misreporting. Hence, we are able to link bunching around a threshold with
tax evasion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. To explain the theoretical relationship
between withholding rates and bunching, we develop in section 2 a conceptual framework
for the empirical work. Section 3 provides institutional details about Tax Administration in
Ecuador. In section 4, we analyze how changes in withholding rates aﬀect reported taxes.
Section 5 explores the relationship between bunching and misreporting. The sixth section
constructs a proﬁle of ﬁrms that bunch and, ﬁnally, the last section concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we use a simple extension of a conventional model of tax evasion to show
how the threshold introduced by the withholding rate can induce bunching of reported taxes.
The model also shows that bunching may indicate tax evasion. The model below is based on
5the Allingham-Sandmo model (Allingham and Sandmo (1972)) which builds on the ‘crime
and punishment’ framework of Becker (1968), and has been widely used to explain agents’
optimal tax evasion choices (see Cowell (1990), Sandmo (2005), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002),
Kleven et al. (2010)).
Assume that risk neutral ﬁrms are taxed a sum that is proportional to their proﬁts. Let
 ∈ (01) be the proﬁtt a xr a t e .W ed e ﬁne Π =  − where Π is the proﬁto fﬁrm  and
 and  are sales and costs respectively. So the true tax liability of ﬁrm  is  = Π
The ﬁrm reports proﬁt  ≤ Π and its tax payments are  =  When   Π,t h eﬁrm
underreports its tax liability and evades taxes. Underreporting proﬁts has consequences.
When tax evasion is detected, the ﬁrm is forced to pay the evaded tax plus a penalty. Under
this scenario, a risk neutral ﬁrm chooses  to maximize its expected after-tax proﬁt:
 =( 1− )[Π − ]+ [(Π − ) −  (1 + )(Π − )] (1)
where  is the probability of detecting tax evasion and  is the penalty rate. If the probability
of detection is constant, then the ﬁrst order conditions imply the following corner solutions:

∗
 = Π if  (1 + )  1

∗
 =0if  (1 + )  1
We now introduce withholding by a third party in the above set-up. The third party with-
holds a proportion of the sales revenue of the ﬁrm . For tractability, we assume that ﬁrms
cannot hide the sales revenue, and thus tax evasion occurs through over-reporting of costs.
But in the empirical implementation, we look for evidence of misreporting of both sales rev-
enue and costs. Let the withholding rate be  s ot h ea m o u n tw i t h h e l d =  We
deﬁne
 =  −  ; and Ψ =






6So  is the net refund claimed by ﬁrm ,a n d˜ Ψ and Ψ are the true tax liability as proportion
of sales revenue and the actual tax payments as proportion of sales revenue respectively. It
is common that the tax authority uses the withholding rate as a focal point to allocate its
auditing resources. If a ﬁrm declares a proﬁt such that   0 and thus claims a refund
it triggers a higher probability of audit, and the ﬁrm may also incur additional compliance
costs to claim the refund. We assume that the probability of detecting tax evasion depends
on the actual tax payments as a proportion of sales; (Ψ) is negative function of Ψ,b u ti t
declines discontinuously when Ψ ≥  (i.e., when  ≤ 0). This discontinuity in the (Ψ)
function can induce the ﬁrms to bunch at or around the withholding threshold  To see this





1 if Ψ 
2 if Ψ ≥ 
with 1  2
Now we consider two types of ﬁrms separately depending on whether the true tax liability
˜ Ψ is lower or higher than the withholding threshold .
First consider the ﬁrms for which the true tax liability is less than the withheld amount
so that we have ˜ Ψ  For such a ﬁrm the optimal reported proﬁt is the actual proﬁta n d
the ﬁrm optimally choose not to evade taxes if 1 is high enough:

∗
 = Π ,i f 1 
1
(1 + )
For rest of the discussion, we assume that 1  1
(1+) holds.8 Such an auditing scheme where
the tax authority concentrates its resources on the ﬁrms below a threshold might be optimal
as shown in the theoretical literature on optimal auditing (see Reinganum and Wilde (1985,
8One might ﬁnd the implication that the ﬁrms with true tax liability below the withholding threshold
do not cheat unrealistic. This feature of our model is, however, shared by all the principal-agent models of
tax compliance where tax authority credibly commits to an audit strategy. In a game theoretic model, in
contrast, it is possible to have ﬁrms cheat below the cut-oﬀ of the withholding rate.
71986)).9
Note that if there is no additional costs associated with claiming the refund, then a ﬁrm
with Ψ ∈ [−] will report its tax liability truthfully and claim a small refund. But if there
are ﬁxed costs of compliance in claiming a refund, then some ﬁrms with true tax liability less
than the threshold  might choose not to claim a refund, thus bunching at  This might
be more attractive if ﬁrm owners incur substantial costs (ﬁnancial and psychological) when
audited; by not claiming a refund it reduces its probability of being audited from 1 to 2
But more interesting and important for our analysis is the behavior of the ﬁrms with true
tax liability higher than the withheld amount so that ˜ Ψ  For these ﬁr m si ti so p t i m a l
to underreport and claim a tax liability exactly equal to the withholding threshold if 2 is










The above model, although simple, makes two important points: (i) bunching at the with-
holding threshold can arise as a result of discontinuity in the auditing probability function
at the threshold, and (ii) many of the ﬁrms that optimally choose to bunch are the ones with
higher tax liability. Thus bunching may be indicative of tax evasion. However, the model
yields the stark conclusion that any ﬁrm with true tax liability higher than the withholding
rate will bunch at the withholding threshold which is clearly unrealistic. This conclusion
is driven by the simplifying assumptions that the probability function is a step function,
and that there is no heterogeneity among ﬁrms in terms of risk preference (and in moral
integrity). For concreteness, let us consider heterogeneity in risk preference with the utility
function of ﬁrm owner  denoted as  log() We assume that the probability function looks
as follows:
9Although an optimal cut-oﬀ rule for auditing depends on the assumption of risk neutrality, a negative
slope of the () function is consistent with more general models. See for example, Andreoni et al. (1998),
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002).
8 (Ψ)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1 if Ψ 
2 if Ψ ∈ [ + ]
2 − (Ψ) if Ψ + 
where (Ψ) ≤ 2 is an increasing concave function. With such a set-up, there will be some
ﬁrms with true tax liability higher than the threshold
³
˜ Ψ + 
´
who would optimally
choose not to bunch at the threshold, especially if they are risk averse enough. Such a
model with heterogeneity in risk preference also implies that there will be adverse selection
of ﬁrms; relatively risk loving ﬁrms would tend to bunch at the threshold to evade taxes.
For such risk loving ﬁrms, we should observe persistence in tax evasion over time, and they
would be more likely to evade taxes even if there is no withholding and no discontinuity in
the audit probability.
W h i l et h et h e o r ya b o v es u g g e s t st h a tt a xe v a s ion could potentially explain any observed
concentration of tax reports around the withholding rate, it also points out the possibility
that some ﬁrms with lower tax liability may choose to bunch to avoid the costs associated with
being audited. In addition, one cannot rule out other explanations. For instance, bunching
could simply reﬂect the shape of the true distribution of ﬁrms’ proﬁts. It is possible (though
highly unlikely) that the tax administration has a good estimate of the true distribution of
proﬁts, and sets the “right” withholding rate—one that facilitates taxpayers comply and pay
the correct tax amount. It is also diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate tax evasion from tax avoidance. In
the empirical sections below, we show that there is, in fact, bunching around the withholding
rate as predicted by the simple model above, and a l s op r o v i d es o m es u g g e s t i v ee v i d e n c et h a t
bunching is associated with tax evasion.
93 Tax Administration, Income Tax and Withholding
System in Ecuador
In this section, we provide some details about the Tax Administration in Ecuador and the
withholding mechanism. The current Ecuadorian Tax Administration Agency — Servicio de
Rentas Internas (SRI) — was created in December, 1997 and is an independent institution
with administrative, ﬁnancial and operational autonomy.
Ecuadorian law requires both individuals and ﬁrms to pay income taxes. Individuals are
taxed a share of their (taxable) income using a progressive tax rate. Firms, on the other
hand, are taxed on their proﬁts using a ﬂat tax rate of 25%. Given space constraints and
the focus of this study, we describe the tax-ﬁling process of ﬁrms only.
Firms are required to ﬁle year  tax returns between February and April of year  +1 .
The SRI has devised two mechanisms that allow it to collect proﬁt taxes before returns are
due: an advance payment system and a withholding mechanism. Advance payments made
during the current year are collected in July and in September. Of course, advance payments
made during year  are deductible from the income tax liability to be ﬁled in year  +1 .
The withholding system is a mechanism where most companies (those that are designated
by the SRI to be withholding agents) are required to deduct and withhold a ﬁxed percentage
o ft h ep a y m e n t st h e ym a k et oo t h e rﬁrms. We refer to this ﬁxed percentage as the withholding
rate, hereafter. This deduction takes place only if the payment is taxable income for those
who receive it. Every month, withholding agents must report and transfer all withholdings
to the tax authority. Firms can deduct their withheld funds, including those from previous
years (up to ﬁve years), from their current tax liability. Sales that ﬁrms make to ﬁnal
consumers (rather than to ﬁrms) are not subject to withholding.
It is possible that withheld amounts exceed the ﬁrm’s tax liabilities. When this is the
case, the SRI does not automatically grant a refund.10 However, companies could submit an
10The SRI keeps the diﬀerence between all advanced payments (including withheld funds) and the ﬁrm’s
10“excess-payment petition” and ask explicitly for a refund. This process is long (about six
months) and requires the ﬁrm to ﬁle additional documents that support the information on
their balance sheets. In many cases, SRI staﬀ will audit ﬁrms and review their accounting
before a refund can be made. It is clear that the monitoring probability increases signiﬁcantly
if a ﬁrm claims a refund.
Withholding rates can be unilaterally changed by the tax authority without any approval
of the legislative or executive power. These rates in a given period vary according to the
goods or services being purchased, and also have changed over time. Table 1 shows how
withholding rates of many categories of products have changed since 2003. In July 1, 2007,
withholding rates for sales of tangible goods and other services (including construction)
increased from 1 to 2 percent. This was an important change that aﬀected a large share
of commercial transactions. Note that, during this period, the withholding rate for sales of
transportation services remained constant at 1 percent.
The withholding rates apply to products listed on Table 1 rather than to ﬁrms.F o r
example, a ﬁrm that sells both manufacturing goods and transportation services could be
subject to diﬀerent withholding rates.11 While there is not a one to one correspondence
between the ﬁrms’ ISIC economic activity and the products it sells, we assume that a) all
ﬁrms in the manufacturing and the retail sector are subject to the withholding rates that
apply to tangible goods purchases, b) all ﬁrms in the construction sector are subject to the
withholding rates that apply to real estate construction activities, and c) all ﬁrms in the
transportation sector are subject to the withholding rates that apply to private passenger
transport and public and private freight services. Given these assumptions, in Table 2, we
show withholding rates that ﬁrms in the construction, manufacturing, retail and transporta-
tax liability unless a petition for a refund is ﬁled.
11For example, after June 2007, a ﬁrm that produces manufacturing goods and transportation services
will be subjected to diﬀerent withholding rates: 2 percent of its manufacturing goods sales and 1 percent of
transportation services sales will be withheld.
11tion sector likely faced during 2006 and 2007. In the empirical sections, we take advantage
of the variation in the withholding rates both across industries and over time to analyze the
proﬁt tax payments of ﬁrms.
4 Does Withholding Lead to Bunching?
In this section, we test if Ecuadorian ﬁrms’ tax/sales ratio (ie., Ψ) concentrates around
the withholding rate (). We start by describing the data and, later, show graphical and
econometric evidence that ﬁrms do bunch around the withholding threshold.
Data
We have collected the universe of ﬁrms’ proﬁt tax returns using administrative data of the
SRI (tax Form 101) for years 2006 and 2007. We focus on ﬁrms in the following four economic
activities: construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade and retail, and transportation. This
allows us to exploit the variation in the withholding rates both across industries and over time
that was described in the previous section. After eliminating duplicates and observations
with missing data, we are left with a balanced panel of 12,406 ﬁrms per year.
Details about the variables and descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3. Ecuadorian
ﬁrms’ assets in these industries averaged $1.7 and $1.9 million in 2006 and 2007, respectively.
Their mean annual revenue (sales) increased from $2.9 million in 2006 to $3.3 million in 2007.
Average proﬁt tax liability also increased from $28,000 to $35,000. This reveals a rather
low tax/sales ratio (close to 0.01). Besides assets, sales, and taxes, we have also collected
information about the location of the ﬁrm (if it is located in the Coastal region), whether
it is involved in any importing or exporting activity of any kind, and if the ﬁrm has been
designated as a Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU).12
Bunching: Graphical Evidence
12Large Taxpayer Units (LTUs) are large ﬁrms subject to tighter monitoring and controls from the Tax
Authority.
12We ﬁrst provide some graphical evidence about bunching by estimating the distribution
of the ﬁrms’ tax/sales ratio (Ψ) in each of the four industries we focus on. The theoretical
analysis suggests that bunching should occur exactly at the existing withholding rate. How-
ever, even if all ﬁrms in our sample would report a tax liability that is exactly equal to their
withheld funds, one cannot expect to see a degenerate distribution of the tax/sales ratio.
This is because of the simple fact that sales made to ﬁnal consumers are not subject to with-
holding, and some ﬁrms in our sample sell some of their products to consumers. Moreover,
ﬁrms can also use withheld funds from previous periods (up to ﬁve years) to pay current year
tax liabilities. For these reasons, even if all ﬁrms in our data declare taxes that are identical
to their withheld funds, the distribution of the tax/sales ratio should be concentrated around
(rather than exactly at) the withholding requirement. This concentration should be more
visible in industries where ﬁrms interact less with ﬁnal consumers (such as construction, for
example).
The top parts of Figures 1 to 4 show histograms of the tax/sales ratio in 2006 for ﬁrms in
the manufacturing, construction, retail and transport sectors, respectively. In all industries,
there is a noticeable clustering of ﬁrms around the 0.01 bin, which coincides with the with-
holding requirement of 1%. As expected, the spike in the histogram at 0.01 is more evident
in the construction sector but is clearly visible in all industries. These patterns could have
two interpretations. First, the observed spikes at 1% in 2006 could simply reﬂect the true
distribution of ﬁrms’ tax/sales ratio. Perhaps the tax administration is aware of this from
past empirical evidence, and set, ex-ante, a withholding rate (of 1%) that facilitates most
taxpayers compliance and payment of the correct amount of taxes. Alternatively, as our
theoretical model suggests, bunching around the withholding rate could suggest that ﬁrms
are manipulating their balance sheets to match their tax liabilities to their withheld funds
(either by avoiding or evading taxes).
To distinguish between these two hypotheses, we construct the same histograms for the
13year 2007 when withholding requirements of some industries increased from 1% to 2%. If the
2006 histograms reﬂect the true proﬁt distribution of Ecuadorian ﬁrms, one would not expect
to see much change when withholding rates vary. Interestingly, the spike at the 0.01 tax/sales
ratio bin completely disappears in 2007 in those industries where withholding rates were
modiﬁed (construction, manufacturing and trade).13 Moreover, the spike in the density of
the tax/sales ratio for ﬁrms in the transportation sector seems to remain constant at 0.01 (the
unchanged withholding rate). These observations contradict the ﬁrst interpretation that the
bunching in 2006 at around the withholding threshold is due to underlying heterogeneity in
ﬁrm characteristics, and are more consistent with the predictions from our simple theoretical
model. Note that if selection is important for bunching, we would expect the ﬁrms that
bunched at around the threshold in 2006 to still evade taxes in 2007 (i.e., they are the ‘risk
loving’ or inherently ‘opportunistic’ ﬁrms), but since they do not expect a discontinuity in
the audit probability at that threshold anymore, the resulting tax payments will become
much smoother, as seems to be the case in the Figures 1-4.
How do “Bunchers” Respond to a Change in the Withholding
Rate?
When withholding rates change from 1 to 2 percent, the ﬁrms do not expect a discon-
tinuity in the audit probability around the 1 percent threshold anymore. This implies that
the bunching ﬁrms will optimally adjust their tax payments upward in 2007. In this section
we estimate a series of simple linear regression models to test if ﬁrms that bunch around the
withholding rate in 2006 are more likely to declare a larger tax/sales ratio when withholding
rates are increased.
As a ﬁrst and necessary step to implementing the test, we need to specify the empirical
deﬁnition of “bunching.” As discussed before, the ﬁrms are expected to bunch around the
13Note that the change in withholding rates occurred in the middle of the year (June 2007) and aﬀected
only the second half of the year sales. Thus, one cannot expect to see bunching patterns around the new
withholding rate of 2%.
14withholding threshold, rather than locating exactly at the threshold because of sales to
consumers and carry-over of withheld funds from previous years. We createt h r e ea l t e r n a t i v e
indicators to identify ﬁrms that bunch around the withholding rate in 2006 using alternative
intervals. The variable  equals one if ﬁrm ’s tax/sales ratio in 2006 is between 0.99%
and 1.01%. Similarly, the variables  and  equal one if the 2006 tax/sales ratio falls
within the intervals [0.98%, 1.02%] and [0.97%, 1.03%], respectively. Using these deﬁnitions,
we identify 157, 304 and 454 ﬁrms that “bunch” around the withholding rate, respectively
(see bottom of Table 3).
We then use OLS to estimate the following linear model:
4Ψ = 1 + 2 + 34 + 4 ( ∗ 4)+54 +  (4)
where 4Ψ is the change in ﬁrm ’s tax/sales ratio between 2006 and 2007,  is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if ﬁrm ’s 2006 tax payment lies in the vicinity of the 2006 withholding
rate of 1% (‘vicinity’ deﬁned by three intervals speciﬁed earlier), 4 is the change from
2006 to 2007 in the withholding rate that a ﬁrm is subject to, 4 is a vector with variables
that measure changes in the characteristics of ﬁrms such as assets, and  is the error term.
The variable of interest is the interaction term on the right hand side of equation (4) which
is the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate of the eﬀects of the change in the withholding rate on
reported taxes. If we ﬁnd that 4  0 it implies that ﬁrms who bunched in 2006 around
the withholding threshold show systematically larger changes in their reported tax/sales
ratio when withholding rates are raised (compared to their counterparts subject to constant
withholding rates). So an estimated 4  0 would indicate the ﬁrms that were bunching
reported lower tax/sales ratio in 2006 presumably to take advantage of the discontinuity in
the audit probability around the threshold.
The results are reported in Table 4. To check robustness of the results, we report estimates
from several alternative speciﬁcations of equation (4) including three diﬀerent deﬁnitions
15of bunching discussed above. Speciﬁcations displayed in columns (2), (4) and (6) include
variables that control for changes in (the natural logarithm of) assets (4) while estimates
in the other columns do not.
The ﬁrst three rows of the table show that, in all six speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcient on the
interaction term, 4, is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. For example, estimates from
the fourth speciﬁcation shown in column (4) suggest that ﬁrms who bunched around the
withholding rate in 2006 ( =1 )and that belong to any of the three industries where
withholding rates increased from 0.01 to 0.02, increased their tax/sales ratio by about 0003
more than their counterparts (ﬁrms that bunch in the transportation industry). The esti-
mates are notably robust across diﬀerent speciﬁcations.14
In sum, the empirical evidence presented in Table 4 suggests that ﬁrms that bunch
around the withholding rate in 2006 also declare larger increase in their tax/sales ratio after
withholding rates went up. These results support the hypothesis that the withholding rate
introduces a tax threshold that aﬀects the way ﬁrms declare their taxes. Furthermore, it
seems that ﬁrms who bunch declared systematically lower taxes in 2006. In the next section,
we explore the possible link between bunching and tax evasion in more depth.
5 Does Bunching Indicate Evasion?
The model presented in the conceptual framework suggests that tax evasion could explain
bunching of reported taxes around the withholding rate. It is diﬃcult, however, to attribute
the bunching patterns observed in the data to tax evasion (fraud) rather than to tax avoid-
ance. In this section, we use additional data to test if there is any association between
bunching and tax evasion.
Indicators of Tax Evasion
14While other coeﬃcients on Table 3 are interesting, we do not discuss them here for the sake of brevity.
16Our ﬁrst task consists of ﬁnding indicators of tax evasion. Ideally, we would like to
compare actual sales and costs of ﬁrms with the sales and costs reported in tax returns.
This comparison would enable us to ﬁnd if ﬁrms are, for example, concealing part of their
sales or overstating their costs, or indulging in both (mal)practices.15 While it is nearly
impossible to get data on the actual sales and costs incurred by ﬁrms, we are able to gather
third-party reports about each ﬁrm’s sales and intermediate input costs. Third-party data
w e r et a k e nf r o ma nA n n e xt h a tm o s tﬁrms—as withholding agents— ﬁle every month to the
SRI and from the Ecuadorian Customs Agency where all imports and exports are registered.
Unfortunately, the data from third party reporting is available only for the 2007 ﬁscal year.
We thus cannot test if the ﬁrms that bunched around withholding threshold in 2006 also
reported systematically lower revenue and higher costs in the same year compared to the
third party reporting. But we can test if the ﬁrms that bunched in 2006 report systematically
lower revenue and higher costs in 2007. Note that the withholding rate was changed in July
2007, so for the aﬀected ﬁrms ﬁrst half of the year 2007 withholding rate was 1 percent, and
for the second half it was 2 percent. So we should not expect any bunching around 1 percent
or 2 percent thresholds for the year 2007. However, as discussed in the theoretical model in
section (2) above, if the bunching in 2006 reﬂects self-selection by more risk taking ﬁrms or
ﬁrms owned by individuals with low moral costs of cheating the government, then we would
expect persistence in the behavior of these ﬁr m s ;t h e ya r em o r el i k e l yt oe v a d et a x e st h a n
an average ﬁrm even in 2007. We test if this prediction is borne out by the data.
We ﬁrst compute the variable 1 as the diﬀerence between the natural logarithm of
third-party reported sales and exports-what other ﬁr m sr e p o r tt oh a v ep u r c h a s e df r o ma
particular ﬁrm plus what the Ecuadorian customs report this ﬁrm has exported- and the
natural logarithm of the ﬁrm’s self-reported sales and exports. If third-party reports about
15This is precisely what audits do. Unfortunately, the number of ﬁrms that have been audited in our
sample is very small and, due to conﬁdentiality issues, we could not access this information.
17the ﬁrm’s sales and exports are larger than self reported data, it is likely that the company is
underreporting its revenue. In the second column of Table 5 we present descriptive statistics
of this variable.16 Because third party information on many large ﬁrms is not reported to the
tax authority (SRI), it is not surprising that, on average, self-reported sales are larger than
third-party reports. However, more important for our analysis is the fact that self-reported
sales are smaller than third-party reports in more than 10 percent of cases. The relevant
question is if these are the same ﬁrms that bunched around the withholding threshold in
2006.
Our second indicator of misreporting, 2,i st h ed i ﬀerence between the natural logarithm
of third-party reported sales of intermediate goods to the ﬁrm and imports-what other ﬁrms
report have sold to a particular ﬁrm plus what the Ecuadorian customs report this ﬁrm has
imported- and the natural logarithm of the ﬁrm’s self-reported intermediate input costs and
imports. The third column of Table 5 shows the relevant descriptive statistics. Although on
average self-reported input costs are larger than third-party reports, the relevant question
f o ru si sw h e t h e rt h e“ b u n c h e r s ”i n ﬂated costs more than an average ﬁrm in the sample.
Bunching and Tax Evasion
To explore if ﬁrms who bunch are more likely to misreport information on their tax
returns, we use simple linear models:
1 = 1 + 2 + 
0
Γ +  (5)
2 = 1 + 2 + 
0
Υ +  (6)
where s are indicators of tax misreporting by ﬁrm i (using the two deﬁnitions explained
above), the vector  includes characteristics of the ﬁr m( l i s t e do nT a b l e3 ) ,a n d is the
dummy for bunching as deﬁned earlier in three alternative ways. We focus on the coeﬃcients
16Due to missing observations, when combining all data sources we lose about 9% of our sample. That is,
we use 11,228 observations.
182 and 2 that measure systematic diﬀerences in the dependent variable between those ﬁrms
who bunch and their counterparts.
Bunching and Under-Reporting of Sales Revenue
We ﬁrst focus on 1 (equation 5 above). Note that ﬁrms can lower their tax liabilities by
underreporting their revenue (sales and exports) and that this could be detected when third-
party reported income is larger than self reported revenue; that is, when 1  0. Hence, if
ﬁrms that bunch around the tax threshold are more likely to underreport revenue, a positive
coeﬃcient would be expected, i,e. 2  0.T h e l a r g e r t h i s c o e ﬃcient is, the greater is the
diﬀerence between underreporting of revenue of ﬁrms that bunch and the ﬁrms that do not.
The results from estimating equation (5) are reported in Table 6. To check robustness,
several speciﬁcations are estimated. For instance, separate models have been estimated for
each of the deﬁnitions of bunching described before (that is, we use , ,a n d). In
addition, some models include a larger set of covariates that describe the characteristics of
the ﬁrms (such as its size, economic activity, location, etc.). In all six speciﬁcations we
consider, the estimate of 2 is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels,
and notably robust across speciﬁcations suggesting that ﬁrms that bunch around the tax
threshold in 2006 are more likely to underreport revenue in 2007. These diﬀerences are large
in magnitude; ﬁrms that bunch appear to underreport revenue by about 35 percent more
than their counterparts.
The coeﬃcients on the other parameters are interesting and deserve attention. Firms in
the wholesale and retail sector underreport sales by about 70% less than ﬁrms in the omitted
category (transportation sector). On the contrary, diﬀerences between third-party reported
revenue and self-reported revenue is much larger for construction ﬁrms and for ﬁrms that
are involved in importing or exporting goods.
Bunching and Cost Over-Reporting
19We now turn to the analysis of the relationship between bunching and costs over-reporting.
Firms can lower their tax liabilities by inﬂating the costs of their intermediate inputs (includ-
ing products that have been imported). Because third-party information about the ﬁrm’s
costs is available, costs over-reporting may be more likely to occur the lower the value of 2.
Hence, if ﬁrms who bunch around the tax threshold are more likely to over-report costs, a
negative coeﬃcient is expected, i.e., 2  0.
The estimated results for equation (6) are reported in Table 7. The same six speciﬁcations
used in Table 6 are employed to explain the relationship between 2 and the explanatory
variables. Consistent with our previous ﬁndings, in all speciﬁcations we consider the estimate
of 2 is negative although it is not always statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. These
results suggest that ﬁrms that bunch around the tax threshold are more likely to inﬂate costs
compared to their counterparts that do not bunch. Coeﬃcients of other covariates on Table
7 are consistent with results shown on Table 6. That is, it seems that the same type of
ﬁrms that underreport revenue (1  0) are the ones that over-report costs (2  0).F o r
example, the diﬀerence between third-party and self-reported costs (revenue) is 18% (37%)
smaller (larger) for ﬁrms that are involved in importing or exporting activities.
In sum, the data on revenue and sales from third-party reporting provide strong evidence
that the observed bunching around the withholding threshold indicates tax evasion practices
(fraud).
6 Determinants of Bunching
The bunching patterns described in section (4) have been linked to tax evasion practices.
For auditing and control purposes it may be thus important to ﬁnd the determinants of
bunching. The Tax Administration may then be able to construct a proﬁle of ﬁrms that
should be subjected to tighter controls and create initiatives to prevent and deter fraud.
In addition to ﬁrms’ characteristics, we have been able to collect data about the demo-
20graphic characteristics of the ﬁrm’s general manager (CEO), such as his/her gender, age,
education and marital status. These data come from the Ecuadorian Civil Registry ad-
ministrative records.17 Because we are interested in explaining the determinants of ﬁrms’
bunching in 2006, CEO’s characteristics correspond to the same year. The average CEO of
the ﬁrms we study is a 46 year old married male with college education. The description
and descriptive statistics of these variables are shown in Table 8.
We use simple binary models to estimate the determinants that a ﬁrm bunches. To be
speciﬁc, we let the probability that a ﬁrm’s reported tax/sales ratio is close to the witholding
rate ( =1 ) 18 be a function of a vector of ﬁrm’s characteristics and a vector of general
manager’s characteristics.
Results are shown on Table 9. The ﬁrst three columns of this table use a linear probability
model, while the last three columns display marginal eﬀects of a probit model (evaluated at
the sample means). Because data about the characteristics of ﬁrms and CEOs may not always
be readily available, we create separate proﬁles. We ﬁr s tc o n s i d e rh o wt h ec h a r a c t e r i s t i c so f
ﬁrms alone are correlated with the likelihood of bunching (columns 1 and 4). In columns
(2) and (4) we perform the same exercise but use only the characteristics of the CEO as
explanatory variables. Finally, we estimate a model with the full set of covariates (columns
3a n d6 ) .
Results provide many interesting insights. For example, it seems ﬁrms in the construction
sector are notably more likely (about 3.2 probability points) to bunch around the withholding
rate than their counterparts in other sectors. Firm size, measured through the logarithm of
assets, shows a non-linear (concave) relationship with the dependent variable. For instance,
17SRI Form 101 has to be signed by the ﬁrm’s CEO. We use a unique person identiﬁer available in
Form 101 to link each CEO with the Civil Registry database and collect its demographic characteristics. All
conﬁdential information has been handled and processed in strict compliance with Ecuadorian conﬁdentiality
laws.
18For the sake of brevity and to avoid cluttering, we only analyze the determinants that the variable 
=1. Similar results are found, however, when the variables  or  are used instead.
21the likelihood of bunching increases with assets until total assets reach $85,000, and it de-
creases afterwards.19 These results could be explained in part by diﬀerentiated monitoring
intensity from the SRI to the ﬁrms: small and medium ﬁrms are subject to little monitoring
while larger ﬁrms, particularly LTUs, are subject to tighter controls. Results also suggest
that ﬁrms that are involved in any type of international trade (importer/exporter) and those
located in Ecuador’s Coastal region are more likely to bunch.
The gender and marital status of the general manager are correlated with the probability
of bunching. For instance, companies with male CEOs are about 1 probability point more
likely to bunch than ﬁrms lead by women. Similarly, married general managers are less likely
(about 1 probability point) to declare a proﬁt-tax/revenue ratio close to the withholding rate
compared to non-married managers. Finally, we ﬁnd that other demographic characteristics
of the CEO, such as age and education, are not correlated with bunching.
In sum, small and medium size ﬁrms that belong to the construction sector or are engaged
with international trade (exporting or importing) activities, located in the Coastal region,
and whose manager is an unmarried man, evidence a notably higher probability of bunching
around the proﬁt-tax withholding rate. We have shown in the previous section that bunching
is correlated with tax evasion. Thus, we hope that the discussion above helps authorities
design better customized control mechanisms to deter and prevent tax fraud.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
Using a rich ﬁrm level data set on tax returns in Ecuador, we analyze the implications
of a threshold introduced by a withholding mechanism for ﬁrms’ tax reporting. We show
that the threshold introduced in the tax system by the imposition of a withholding rate for a
ﬁrm’s sales can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the tax behavior of ﬁrms. Withholding creates substantial
bunching of ﬁrms’ tax payments around the threshold. This ﬁnding is interesting because
19These estimates have been computed using estimates displayed on Table 8, column 3.
22withholding rates do not aﬀect the tax liability of a ﬁrm, unlike other thresholds and kinks
in the tax system discussed in the literature such as VAT threshold and kinks due to income
tax brackets in a progressive income tax schedule.
We develop a simple model of tax evasion in the tradition of Allingham and Sandmo
(1972) that incorporates a discontinuity in the audit function around the withholding thresh-
old. This is motivated by the fact that the probability of auditing is much higher when a ﬁrm
declares tax payments lower than the withheld amount and claims a refund. The theoretical
analysis also indicates that bunching may occur primarily through under-reporting by ﬁrms
with higher tax liability and thus may be indicative of evasion.
For the empirical analysis, we take advantage of a quasi-experiment in Ecuador where
the withholding rate was increased for some of the industries and thus allowing us to use
ad i ﬀerence-in-diﬀerence strategy to estimate eﬀects of changing withholding rates on tax
reporting of ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that the bunching around the 1 percent threshold observed in
2006 vanished in 2007 for only those ﬁrms where the withholding rate changed from 1 percent
to 2 percent in June 2007. The evidence shows that the ﬁrms that bunched in 2006 reported
higher taxes in 2007 indicating that they were under-reporting taxes in 2006, presumably to
take advantage of the non-linearity in the audit probability around the threshold. Finally,
using revenue and cost data reported by third parties, we provide additional evidence that
the ﬁrms who bunch systematically understate revenue and overstate costs compared to other
ﬁrms in 2007. This implies that even though they increased their tax payments when the
withholding rate changed, the bunching ﬁrms are still more likely to evade taxes irrespective
of the withholding threshold. This evidence is consistent with a theoretical model where at
least part of the bunching is due to the adverse selection of ﬁrms where more risk takers (or
owners with low moral costs of cheating) bunch around the withholding threshold.
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26Figure 1: Profit-Taxes Reported by Manufacturing Firms
Year 2006
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Private passenger transportation and public and private 
freight services 1% 1% 1%
Tangible goods purchases (except fuels) 1% 1% 2%
Real estate construction activities, urbanization, 
division into lots and the like 1% 1% 2%
Services performed by individuals where manpower 
prevails over intellect 1% 1% 2%
Financial gains (interests, discounts, etc.) 5% 5% 2%
Leasing of real estate owned by firms 5% 5% 8%
Leasing of real estate owned by individuals 8% 5% 8%
Fees, commissions, royalties and other payments of 
professional or other services where intellect prevails 8% 5% 8%
Real estate and fuel purchases 0% 0% 0%
Products  Withholding rates
Notes: Data was gathered from the Servicio de Rentas Internas, Resoluciones de Conocimiento General
(Resolutions for the public knowledge). Due to space constraints, other categories that have not been included in
this table.Table 2: Profit-Tax Witholding Rates (Withholding as a Fraction of Sales)
Industry
From Jan. 06 to 
June 07




Wholesale and Retail  0.01 0.02
Transportation 0.01 0.01
Notes: Based on the information provided on Table 1, Table 2 summarizes the withholding rate that generally
applies to the typical firm in each of the four industries above.Table 3: Characteristics of the Firm
Number of Observations per Year: 12,406
Variable Name Description Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Sales
Total sales ($ thousands) reported by firms in tax 
return. 2,914.0 28,300.0 3,338.2 30,100.0
Tax
Profit-tax ($ thousands) declared by firms in tax 
return. 28.2 349.6 35.1 387.1
Assets
Total assets ($ thousands) reported by firms in tax 
return. 1,686.8 12,900.0 1,893.0 14,700.0
Tax / Sales Reported profit-tax as a share of total sales. 0.009 0.018 0.011 0.018
Manufacturing Equals 1 if Manufacturing firm. 0.216 0.411 0.216 0.411
Construction Equals 1 if Construction firm.  0.089 0.284 0.089 0.284
Wholesale / Retail  Equals 1 if Wholesale or Retail Trade firm. 0.567 0.495 0.567 0.495
Transportation Equals 1 if firm Transportation firm. 0.129 0.335 0.129 0.335
Firm in Coastal 
Region Equals 1 if firm is settled near the coast  line. 0.424 0.494 0.424 0.494
Importer / Exporter
Equals 1 if firm's economic activity includes 
importing or exporting goods and services. 0.513 0.500 0.513 0.500
Large Taxpayer
Unit
Equals 1 if the firm is a Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU). 
LTUs are large firms that receive tighter controls from 
the Ecuadorian Tax Administration. 0.177 0.382 0.177 0.382
Ba
Equals 1 if firm's 2006 tax / sales ratio is between 
0.99% and 1.01%. 0.013 0.112
Bb
Equals 1 if firm's 2006 tax / sales ratio is between 
0.98% and 1.02%. 0.025 0.155
Bc
Equals 1 if firm's 2006 tax / sales ratio is between 
0.97% and 1.03%. 0.037 0.188
2006 2007Table 4: Witholding Rates and Bunching
Ba * [ Change in W. Rates () ] 0.466 *** 0.471 ***
(0.173)   (0.169)      
Bb * [ Change in W. Rates () ] 0.330 ** 0.347 **
   (0.151)   (0.149)    
Bc * [ Change in W. Rates () ] 0.339 *** 0.342 ***
     (0.130)   (0.124)  
Ba: 1 ( | tax/sales - | < .0001 ) -0.0039 *** -0.0038 ***
(0.0014)   (0.0014)      
Bb: 1 ( | tax/sales - | < .0002 ) -0.0018 -0.0019
   (0.0013)   (0.0013)    
Bc: 1 ( | tax/sales - | < .0003 ) -0.0024 ** -0.0024 **
     (0.0012)   (0.0011)  
Change in Witholding Rates () 0.181 *** 0.202 *** 0.179 *** 0.200 *** 0.175 ** 0.196 ***
(0.069)   (0.068)   (0.069)   (0.068)   (0.070)   (0.069)  
Change in Log Assets 0.0064 *** 0.0064 *** 0.0064 ***
  (0.00236)    (0.00236)    (0.00236)  
Change in (Log Assets Squared) -0.0002 ** -0.0002 ** -0.0002 **
  (0.00010)    (0.00010)    (0.00010)  
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)  
Number of observations 12,406 12,406 12,406 12,406 12,406 12,406
Dependent Variable is the Difference Between the Firm's 2007 Tax/Sales Ratio and its 2006 Tax/Sales 
Ratio
Note: Table shows results from a linear OLS model. Dependent variable is the change in firm's profit-
tax/revenue ratio from 2006 to 2007. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, ***, denote significance at
the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.  is the 2006 withholding rate.
 (1)   (2)   (6)   (5)   (4)   (3) Table 5: Differences Between Third-Party and Self-Reported Data
Descriptive Statistics D1 D2
Mean -0.78 -0.74
Standard Deviation 1.66 1.10
Number of observations 11,228 11,595
Percentile
   5th -3.64 -2.79
   10th -2.49 -2.08
   25th -1.13 -1.05
   50th -0.39 -0.44
   75th -0.09 -0.15
   90th 0.01 -0.01
   95th 0.21 0.22
Notes: D1 is the difference between the natural logarithm of third-party reported sales and
exports-what other firms report to have purchased from a particular firm plus what the
Ecuadorian customs report this firm has exported- and the natural logarithm of the firm’s self-
reported sales and exports. D2 is the difference between the natural logarithm of third-party
reported sales of intermediate goods to the firm and imports-what other firms report have sold to
a particular firm plus what the Ecuadorian customs report this firm has imported- and the natural
logarithm of the firm’s self-reported intermediate input costs and imports. All data correspond to
the 2007 fiscal year.Table 6: Bunching and Sales Misreporting
Ba: 1 ( | tax/sales - | < .0001 ) 0.380 *** 0.355 ***
(0.123)   (0.124)      
Bb: 1 ( | tax/sales - | < .0002 ) 0.325 *** 0.302 ***
   (0.073)   (0.074)    
Bc: 1 ( | tax/sales - | < .0003 ) 0.363 *** 0.351 ***
     (0.056)   (0.057)  
Manufacturing -0.042 -0.161 * -0.043 -0.162 * -0.043 -0.161 *
(0.096)   (0.096)   (0.096)   (0.096)   (0.096)   (0.096)  
Construction 0.251 ** 0.230 ** 0.246 ** 0.227 ** 0.243 ** 0.224 **
(0.113)   (0.112)   (0.113)   (0.112)   (0.113)   (0.112)  
Wholesale / Retail  -0.598 *** -0.700 *** -0.597 *** -0.699 *** -0.595 *** -0.695 ***
(0.095)   (0.095)   (0.095)   (0.095)   (0.095)   (0.095)  
Log of Assets -0.627 *** -0.628 *** -0.631 ***
  (0.075)    (0.075)    (0.075)  
Log of Assets Squared 0.025 *** 0.025 *** 0.025 ***
  (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)  
Importer / Exporter 0.372 *** 0.370 *** 0.370 ***
(0.036)   (0.036)   (0.036)  
  Large TaxpayerUnit -0.164 *** -0.164 *** -0.162 ***
(0.044)   (0.044)   (0.044)  
Firm in Coastal Region 0.051 * 0.050 0.047
(0.031)   (0.031)   (0.031)  
Constant -0.433 *** 3.306 *** -0.436 *** 3.312 *** -0.443 *** 3.320 ***
(0.093)   (0.480)   (0.093)   (0.480)   (0.093)   (0.480)  
Number of Observations 11,228 11,228 11,228 11,228 11,228 11,228
Dependent Variable is D1: the Difference Between the Natural Log of Sales and Exports Reported by 
Third Parties and the Natural Log of Self-Reported Sales and Exports During 2007
Note: Table shows results from a linear OLS model. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, ***,
denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.  is the 2006 withholding rate of 0.01.
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) Table 7: Bunching and Costs Misreporting
Ba: 1 ( | tax/sales - | < .0001 ) -0.076 -0.033
(0.106)   (0.104)      
Bb: 1 ( | tax/sales - | < .0002 ) -0.152 ** -0.102
   (0.071)   (0.070)    
Bc: 1 ( | tax/sales - | < .0003 ) -0.157 *** -0.116 **
     (0.058)   (0.057)  
Manufacturing 0.594 *** 0.478 *** 0.595 *** 0.478 *** 0.595 *** 0.478 ***
(0.052)   (0.054)   (0.052)   (0.054)   (0.052)   (0.054)  
Construction 0.328 *** 0.261 *** 0.332 *** 0.263 *** 0.334 *** 0.265 ***
(0.061)   (0.061)   (0.061)   (0.061)   (0.061)   (0.061)  
Wholesale / Retail  0.557 *** 0.505 *** 0.557 *** 0.505 *** 0.557 *** 0.504 ***
(0.050)   (0.052)   (0.050)   (0.052)   (0.050)   (0.052)  
Log of Assets 0.157 *** 0.158 *** 0.159 ***
  (0.049)    (0.049)    (0.049)  
Log of Assets Squared -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.003 *
  (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)  
Importer / Exporter -0.183 *** -0.182 *** -0.182 ***
(0.022)   (0.022)   (0.022)  
  Large TaxpayerUnit 0.208 *** 0.208 *** 0.208 ***
(0 024) (0 024) (0 024)
Dependent Variable is D2: the Difference Between the Natural Log of Intermediate Inputs and 
Imports Costs Reported by Third Parties and the Natural Log of Self-Reported Inputs and Imports 
During 2007
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Firm in Coastal Region -0.164 *** -0.163 *** -0.162 ***
(0.020)   (0.020)   (0.020)  
Constant -1.231 *** -2.474 *** -1.229 *** -2.480 *** -1.227 *** -2.483 ***
(0.049)   (0.317)   (0.049)   (0.317)   (0.049)   (0.318)  
Number of Observations 11,595 11,595 11,595 11,595 11,595 11,595
Note: Table shows results from a linear OLS model. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, ***,
denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.  is the 2006 withholding rate of 0.01.Table 8: Characteristics of Firm's General Manager (CEO)
Number of Observations: 12,045
Variable Name Description Mean St. Dev.
CEO Male Equals 1 if firm's CEO is male and 0 otherwise. 0.807 0.395
CEO Age CEO's age in years (in 2006). 45.6 11.5
CEO College Equals one if the firm's CEO has college education. 0.519 0.500
CEO Married Equals 1 if the firm's CEO is married. 0.775 0.417
CEO born in 
Coastal Region
Equals 1 if the firm's CEO was born in the Coastal 
Region. 0.388 0.487
2006Table 9: Determinants of Firms' Bunching 
Dependent Variable Equals One if Firm's 2006 Tax/Sales Ratio is Between 0.98% and 1.02%
Manufacturing 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006
(0.005)    (0.005)   (0.006)    (0.006)  
Construction 0.032 *** 0.032 *** 0.033 *** 0.032 ***
(0.008)    (0.008)   (0.011)    (0.011)  
Wholesale / Retail  -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.004)    (0.004)   (0.005)    (0.005)  
Log of Assets 0.016 *** 0.017 *** 0.0194 *** 0.0202 ***
(0.004)    (0.004)   (0.006)    (0.006)  
Log of Assets Squared -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
(0.000)    (0.000)   (0.000)    (0.000)  
Importer / Exporter 0.013 *** 0.013 *** 0.012 *** 0.012 ***
(0.003)    (0.003)   (0.003)    (0.003)  
  Large TaxpayerUnit -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0003
(0.005)    (0.005)   (0.004)    (0.004)  
Firm in Coastal Region 0.012 *** 0.010 ** 0.011 *** 0.010 **
(0.003)    (0.005)   (0.003)    (0.005)  
CEO Male 0.008 ** 0.008 ** 0.007 ** 0.006 **
  (0.003)   (0.004)    (0.003)   (0.003)  
CEO Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001)   (0.001)    (0.001)   (0.001)  
CEO Age Square  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)   (0.000)    (0.000)   (0.000)  
CEO College 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.002
(0.003)   (0.003)    (0.003)   (0.003)  
CEO Married -0.010 ** -0.008 ** -0.009 ** -0.007 **
(0.004)   (0.004)    (0.004)   (0.003)  
CEO born in Coastal Region 0.010 *** 0.001 0.010 *** 0.001
(0.003)   (0.005)    (0.003)   (0.004)  
Constant -0.073 0.043 ** -0.057 **
(0.021) (0.021)   (0.029)     
Number of Observations 12,045 12,045 12,045 12,045 12,045 12,045
Linear Probability Model Marginal Effects Probit Model
Note: Dependent variable is the variable Bb. Marginal effects of probit model are evaluated at sample means. *,
**, ***, denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 